Yes, This means Ahmadinejad Won the Election

February 5th, 2010 § 4 Comments

Quick question: what do confused sectors of the Western radical left and the editorial board of the New York Times agree about? That last June’s Iranian presidential election, which almost certainly was not fraud­u­lent, was fraud­u­lent, that Ahmadine­jad is not the legit­i­mately elected president of Iran, that to analyze or criticize the tactics or ide­olo­gies of the green movement is tan­ta­mount to Stalinism, and that the correct political stance vis-a-vis the green movement is posting YouTube videos of pro­test­ers pummeling working-class basij.

For the NYT, this is a matter of massaging reality so as to prepare the symbolic ground for imperial warfare and desta­bi­liza­tion. For the Empire, an inde­pen­dent nuclear-capable Iran is haram (forbidden). A state of suicide bombers armed with fissile material? Oh hell no. Muslims can barely be relied upon to refrain from building minarets or misogynistically con­trol­ling their women, in stark contrast to the coura­geous feminism that permeates the West. The repressed men of The Muslim World would almost certainly manifest their frus­tra­tion in Armaged­don if they got remotely near a nuclear weapon, and the West–lily-white pure when it comes to visiting Armaged­don upon other people–could not possibly tolerate such a frightening prospect.

Anyway, put to the side the tactical question of where Western leftists should orient their efforts–unremittingly against sanctions, clearly, which are option one in the rejec­tion­is­tist imperial armory. (Putting this political question aside is slightly ridicu­lous since it’s actually the only relevant issue right now for leftists or liberals). And then move on to some poll analysis that should seal shut the debate about Ahmadinejad’s social support–a proxy for Iranian sentiment con­cern­ing populist economic policies. This is something I harp about with abrasive frequency. When American leftists have no movement–like right now–we look around for something dis­tract­ingly beguiling. In this case, something so inchoate and that pulls in so many direc­tions that it makes it easy to impose our rev­o­lu­tion­ary hopes upon a non-revolutionary situation.

Yes, millions mobilized as part of the Green Wave in June and more recently during Ashura. The green movement is real. But here’s the problem. The Iranian state is strong, deeply-embedded in civil society through a range of social welfare programs, many of them directed towards the rural poor, others benefiting the urban lower-classes. And the Iranian gov­ern­ment, extending well beyond Ahmadine­jad, is also repres­sive and anti-democratic. Repres­sive and anti-democratic gov­ern­ments frequently provoke back­lashes in favor of democracy. And sometimes, those back­lashes redound neg­a­tively upon the working-classes. Sometimes author­i­tar­i­an­ism brings pros­per­ity. This stuff is fairly obvious and banal, but debate on Iran tends to cliche, train-wrecked syllogism, and the crafting of straw-men, so sometimes it’s helpful to pedantically lay out the obvious, which I do by way of massively ellip­ti­cal intro­duc­tion to a poll from WorldPublicOpinion. Its gist? Iranians may not like their gov­ern­ment but they do think Ahmadine­jad is their legit­i­mately elected president. The reason a majority of Iranians voted for him? Probably because his gov­ern­ment is perceived, more-or-less rightly, as one in favor of economic populism within a global neo-liberal regime of accu­mu­la­tion. My thinking? So long as the Green Movement fails to braid together economic redistribution and political lib­er­al­ism, it will not gain the crucial societal mass that will enable it to become a force capable of restruc­tur­ing the Iranian state so as to enable it to defend the Iranian people from both the economic and military arms of the Empire. Tra­di­tion­ally, defense of economic redis­tri­b­u­tion and fighting the empire were the concerns of radicals, dis­si­dents, and social­ists. So were facts. In modern times, not so much.

Indi­ca­tions of fraud in the June 12 Iranian pres­i­den­tial election, together with large-scale street demon­stra­tions, have led to claims that Mahmoud Ahmadine­jad did not actually win the election, and that the majority of Iranians perceive their gov­ern­ment as ille­git­i­mate and favor regime change.

An analysis of multiple polls of the Iranian public from three different sources finds little evidence to support such conclusions.

The analysis conducted by the Program on Inter­na­tional Policy Attitudes at the Uni­ver­sity of Maryland (PIPA), was based on:

  • a series of 10 recently-released polls conducted by the Uni­ver­sity of Tehran; eight conducted in the month before the June 12 election and two conducted in the month after the election, based on telephone inter­views conducted within Iran
  • a poll by GlobeScan conducted shortly after the election, based on telephone inter­views conducted within Iran
  • a poll by WorldPublicOpinion.org (managed by PIPA) conducted August 27–September 10, based on telephone inter­views made by calling into Iran
Pre-Election Voting Intentions
Post-Election Self-Reports of Vote Choice
Confidence in Institutions

The study sought to address the widely-discussed hypothe­ses that Ahmadine­jad did not win the June 12 election and that the Iranian people perceive their gov­ern­ment as ille­git­i­mate.  It also sought to explore the assump­tion that the oppo­si­tion rep­re­sents a movement favoring a sub­stan­tially different posture toward the United States.  The analysis of the data found little evidence to support any of these hypotheses.

Steven Kull, director of PIPA, said, “Our analysis suggests that it would not be prudent to base US policy on the assump­tion that the Iranian public is in a pre-revolutionary state of mind.”

On the question of whether Ahmadine­jad won the June 12 election, in the week before the election and after the election, in all polls a majority said they planned to or did vote for Ahmadine­jad.  These numbers ranged from 52 to 57% imme­di­ately before the election and 55 to 66% after the election.

Steven Kull comments, “These findings do not prove that there were no irreg­u­lar­i­ties in the election process.  But they do not support the belief that a majority rejected Ahmadinejad.”

The analysis did reveal factors that could have con­tributed to the impres­sion that Ahmadine­jad did not win.  Uni­ver­sity of Tehran polls show that in the first few weeks of the campaign his support dropped pre­cip­i­tously and he did not enjoy majority support in the city of Tehran.  But in the week before the election, his support recovered outside the capital.

Going into the election 57% said they expected Ahmadine­jad to win.  Thus it is not sur­pris­ing that, in several post-election polls, more than seven in ten said they saw Ahmadine­jad as the legit­i­mate president.  About eight in ten said the election was free and fair.

The polls did reveal some reser­va­tions about the gov­ern­ment.  Less than a majority expressed full con­fi­dence in the Guardian Council (42%) and the Ministry of the Interior (38%).  While over eight in ten said they were satisfied with the current system of gov­ern­ment, in June less than a majority (49%) said they were very satisfied and this number dropped to 41% in July.

However none of the polls found indi­ca­tions of support for regime change.  Large majori­ties, including majori­ties of Mousavi sup­port­ers, endorse the Islamist character of the regime such as having a body of Islamic scholars with the power to veto laws they see as contrary to sharia.

To address the pos­si­bil­ity that the data collected within Iran may have been fab­ri­cated, PIPA compared the patterns of responses, including within subgroups, in data collected inside Iran to those collected by calling into Iran from the outside.  Steven Kull comments, “The patterns of responses at many levels are so similar, whether the data was collected inside Iran or by calling into Iran, that it is hard to conclude that these data were fabricated.”

Another concern is that Iranian respon­dents were not answering candidly out of fear of some type of reprisal for making state­ments in support of the oppo­si­tion or critical of the regime, par­tic­u­larly in the post-election envi­ron­ment.  As noted above, on some questions majori­ties expressed views that were less than fully laudatory of the government.

Still there was the fact that after the election, the numbers express­ing support for Mousavi dimin­ished suggests that some self-censoring may have been occurring.  Thus PIPA put special emphasis on analyzing the responses of those who felt bold enough to say that they voted for the oppo­si­tion on the assump­tion that they would be frank on other issues as well.  While Mousavi sup­port­ers are less affir­ma­tive of the legit­i­macy of the regime than the public as a whole, still a majority says that they believe that Ahmadine­jad is the legit­i­mate president and affirm the Islamist nature of the regime.

Some analysts have suggested that if the oppo­si­tion were to gain power this would lead to fun­da­men­tal changes in the Iranian posture toward the US.  Focusing on those respon­dents who said they voted for Mousavi, as an approx­i­ma­tion of the oppo­si­tion, PIPA found that a majority were ready to negotiate with the US on a number of issues, while the Iranian public as a whole was more divided.  However, Mousavi sup­port­ers, like the general public, were quite negative in their views of the US gov­ern­ment and were strongly committed to Iran’s nuclear program.

A majority of Mousavi sup­port­ers did favor diplo­matic relations with the US, and were ready to make a deal whereby Iran would preclude devel­op­ing nuclear weapons through intrusive inter­na­tional inspec­tions in exchange for the removal of sanctions.  However, this was equally true of the majority of all Iranians.

Full Report (PDF)
Ques­tion­naire with Findings, Method­ol­ogy for All Three Surveys (PDF)

WPO Dataset for Download (SPSS Format)
GlobeScan Dataset for Download (SPSS Format)

[Thanks Yoshie]

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§ 4 Responses to Yes, This means Ahmadinejad Won the Election

  • malangbaba says:

    prepare for the incoming hate…

  • Ludwik Kowalski says:

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    Just published: AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A FORMER COMMUNIST

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    P.S. The book is waiting for a reviewer
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  • Lloyd G. says:

    “…that to analyze or criticize the tactics or ide­olo­gies of the green movement is tan­ta­mount to Stalinism…”

    Make that ‘Hitlerism’. Most of the Lefties I know are ambivalent about Stalin. Yeah, he murdered Trotsky (and several million others), but he bore most of the load in the defeat of Nazism in Europe.

  • Ludwik Kowalski says:

    My printed book promoted above (2/6/2010) did not sell very well, even after good reviews appeared on amazon.com

    That is why I decided to make it available at no cost. Here is how I am now promoting the modified book:

    Dear colleagues,

    1) As per our previous correspondence, I want you to know about my new book. Anyone can now read it ONLINE. And it is FREE.

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    http://csam.montclair.edu/~kowalski/life/intro.html

    2) Please share this URL with all who might be interested. Thank you in advance.

    The title is: “Diary of a Former Communist: Thoughts, Feelings, Reality.”

    This 2010 book is my autobiography. It is based on a diary I kept between 1946 and 2004 (in the USSR, Poland, France and the USA).

    3) Comments, as always, will be appreciated. I expect my book to be readable by all browsers and under all operating systems. (Please send me a private message immediately if the content is not clearly displayed on your computer screen.)

    Ludwik Kowalski
    Professor Emeritus
    Montclair State University (USA)
    kowalskiL@mail.montclair.edu

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