These are the birth pangs of Obama’s new regional order

Supporters listen to Ahmadinejads speech
Supporters listen to Ahmadinejad's speech

Seumas Milne sums up well the reasons why some caution is necessary. ‘The turmoil in Tehran reflects a refusal to accept Amadinejad is popular and confusion about how to respond to the US’, he writes.

Also, it appears Robert Fisk can’t decide from one day to another where he stands. On his first day he had declared Ahmadinejad a winner because someone told him so. Now he is claiming, based on the photocopy of a forged letter being distributed at an opposition rally, that not only did Ahmadinejad lose, he lost by a margin of 4-to-1. Imagine that!  And why would a veteran journalist suspend his skepticism to clutch at such an obviously bogus piece of propaganda? (which among other things also claims that Mehdi Karroubi — a man that independent polls showed receiving 2 percent, as opposed to AN’s 34 percent — won more than twice as many votes as Ahmadinejad). Look at the reasoning of this doyen of British journalism:

In a highly sophisticated society like Iran, forgery is as efficient as anywhere in the West and there are reasons for both distrusting and believing this document. But it divides the final vote between Mr Mousavi and Mr Karroubi in such a way that it would have forced a second run-off vote – scarcely something Mousavi’s camp would have wanted.

So Fisk first asserts that the reasons for believing a document with such outlandish claims inconsistent with any known independent polls and the dubious manner in which it was acquired are just as good as the reasons for doubting it. He then nudges the reader toward his implicit conclusion, that the document can’t be a forgery, since it does not give Mousavi outright victory. Who could argue with such impeccable deductive reasoning? This is not journalism, this is propaganda.

Here’s Milne’s corrective:

‘They have elected a ­Labour government,” a Savoy diner famously declared on the night of Britain’s election landslide in 1945. “The country will never stand for it.” From the evidence so far coming out of Iran, something similar seems to be ­happening on the streets of Tehran – and in the western capitals just as desperate to see the back of Iranian president ­Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

Of course the movement behind opposition candidate Mir Hossein Mousavi spreads far beyond the capital’s elite, as did the supporters of Winston Churchill against Clement Attlee. In Iran, it includes large sections of the middle class, students and the secular. But a similar misreading of their own social circles for the country at large appears to have convinced the opposition’s supporters that it can only have lost last Friday’s election through fraud.

That is also reflected in the western media, whose cameras focus so lovingly on Tehran’s gilded youth and for whom Ahmadinejad is nothing but a Holocaust-denying fanatic. The other Ahmadinejad, who is seen to stand up for the country’s independence, expose elite corruption on TV and use Iran’s oil wealth to boost the incomes of the poor majority, is largely invisible abroad.

While Mousavi promised market reforms and privatisation, more personal freedom and better relations with the west, the president increased pensions and public sector wages and handed out cheap loans. So it’s hardly surprising that Ahmadinejad should have a solid base among the working class, the religious, small town and rural poor – or that he might have achieved a similar majority to that of his first election in 2005. That’s what one of the few genuinely independent polls (the US-based Ballen-Doherty survey) predicted last month, when the Times reported Ahmadinejad was “expected to win”.

But such details have got lost as the pressure has built in Tehran for a “green revolution” amid unsubstantiated claims that the election was stolen. The strongest evidence appears to be some surprising regional results and the speed of the official announcement, triggered by Mousavi’s declaration that he was the winner before the polls closed. But most official figures don’t look so ­implausible – Mousavi won Tehran, for instance, by 2.2m votes to 1.8m – and it’s hard to believe that rigging alone could account for the 11 million-vote gap between the main contenders.

If Ahamdinejad was in fact the winner, then there is an attempted coup going on in Tehran right now, and it is being led by Mousavi and his western-backed supporters. But for the demonstrators facing repression in Tehran, the conviction that they have been cheated has created its own momentum in what is now a highly polarised society. That is given more force by the fact that the protests are underpinned by a split in the theocratic regime, of which Mousavi and his allies are a powerful component.

Part of that is about a perceived threat to their own economic interests. But the division also reflects differences within the establishment about how to respond to Barack Obama and the overtures from Washington. All factions uphold Iran’s right to continue nuclear reprocessing, but Mousavi’s campaign was critical of the level of support given to Hezbollah and Hamas, while Ahmadinejad’s supporters argue that only toughness can win western acceptance of Iran’s status as a new regional power.

Iran is of course at the centre of an arc of crisis across the greater Middle East, from Palestine to Pakistan: the legacy of the Bush administration’s catastrophic failure in Iraq and the wider war on terror. And as the US attempts to reconstitute its hegemony in the region on a new basis – for which Obama’s speech to the Muslim world in Cairo was supposed to set the tone – there’s reason to believe that the birth pangs of the new order may yet turn out to be as painful as the death throes of the old.

Last Friday, even before the polls had closed in Iran, the US president ­commented that people were ­”looking at new possibilities” in Iran, just as they had in Lebanon’s elections the previous weekend. In fact, the unexpected defeat of Hezbollah’s opposition coalition (which nevertheless won the largest number of votes) seems to have had more to do with local Lebanese sectarian issues and large-scale vote buying than the Obama effect. But the implications of his remarks were not lost in Iran, where the US is still spending hundreds of millions of dollars in covert destabilisation programmes.

Obama’s public engagement over the Israel-Palestine conflict has so far elicited a commitment by Israel’s Benjamin Netanyahu to the paper ­principle of a Palestinian state – backed by both his predecessors and George Bush and hedged around with so many restrictions it would barely merit Ruritanian status – but no climbdown over illegal settlement expansion. The chances of a negotiated deal in such conditions seem minimal, particularly in the absence of Hamas, and the prospects that a US plan for a settlement might then fail and plunge the region back into conflict relatively high.

Meanwhile, ­resistance and wider violence have been growing again in Iraq, as US occupation troops pull back from the cities. And in Afghanistan, far from ­winding down the occupation, Obama is ­escalating the conflict as promised, with another 21,000 US troops being sent this ­summer to fight the ­unwinnable war, as attacks on Nato forces have reached an all-time peak. At the same time, the spread of the Afghan war into ­neighbouring Pakistan has left thousands of civilians dead, created more than two million refugees and led to a civilian carnage from US drone attacks across the northwest of the country.

In case anyone imagined such wars of western occupation would become a thing of the past in the wake of the ­discredited Bush administration, ­General Dannatt, head of the ­British army, recently set out to disabuse them. Echoing US defence secretary Robert Gates, he insisted: “Iraq and ­Afghanistan are not aberrations – they are signposts for the future”.

In such a context, the neutralisation of Iran as an independent regional power would be a huge prize for the US – defanging recalcitrants from Baghdad to Beirut – and a route out of the strategic impasse created by the invasion of Iraq. But so far, the signs from Tehran are still that that’s unlikely to be achieved by a colour-coded revolution.

Author: Idrees Ahmad

I am a Lecturer in Digital Journalism at the University of Stirling and a former research fellow at the University of Denver’s Center for Middle East Studies. I am the author of The Road to Iraq: The Making of a Neoconservative War (Edinburgh University Press, 2014). I write for The Observer, The Nation, The Daily Beast, Los Angeles Review of Books, The Atlantic, The New Republic, Al Jazeera, Dissent, The National, VICE News, Huffington Post, In These Times, Le Monde Diplomatique, Die Tageszeitung (TAZ), Adbusters, Guernica, London Review of Books (Blog), The New Arab, Bella Caledonia, Asia Times, IPS News, Medium, Political Insight, The Drouth, Canadian Dimension, Tanqeed, Variant, etc. I have appeared as an on-air analyst on Al Jazeera, the BBC, TRT World, RAI TV, Radio Open Source with Christopher Lydon, Alternative Radio with David Barsamian and several Pacifica Radio channels.

7 thoughts on “These are the birth pangs of Obama’s new regional order”

  1. Since early Saturday morning last, here in North America, it’s been, to me at least, evident that individuals I’d normally read for clear reasonably trustworthy information had moved from reality based to the faith based viewing the world. Except that taser companies and law enforcement have already garnered the term, I’d say Fisk et al are suffering from “excited delirium”. When things settle down, as they will and I hope peacefully, I’m waiting to enjoy their pretzel shaped contortions to explain themselves and maintain any creditability. I expect no apologizes or admissions of poor or immature judgement. I thought some wisdom came with age but maybe not in a twitter driven Obamian Age.

  2. BBC is doctoring images of huge crowds in Iran that caption the pictures as Mousavi rallies but omit the image of Ahmadinejad waving from a balcony.

    Fisk has probably fallen for that one.One would have hoped for more powers of perception from such an intrepid reporter.Seems,like Dreyfuss,Fisk is now “on message”.

    Aside from Fisk,the BBC reporters like Simpson and Caroline Hawley are known intelligence services assets.

    With BBC reports becoming characteristically more bizarre each day the act of resorting to Auntie to gauge what’s currently happening in Iran would be an act of desperation.

    Preceding each new report the BBC has been insisting that their reporters have been banned from the streets.Yet Simpson could clearly be seen in early post-election reports at the epicentre of large Mousavi rallies which could just as easily have been captioned as spontaneous pro-Simpson the Liberator rallies!

    Given their proclivity for deception such an image and caption would not be be beyond the BBC.

  3. Just like the Hamas electoral victory sorted out those that are genuinely concerned for the rights of the Palestinians from those that were only in it until the left could squeeze out the most from the struggles compatibility with their marxist views , and sorted out those from the diaspora who were genuinely interested in the rights of Palestinians under occupation from those that had made Fatah membership a careerist enterprise , we see now journalists and academics meeting or failing the same challenges being brought out from this election.
    Fisk and dreyfuss are bigtime failures on this front.And Parsi seems a choice failure from the Diaspora front.

  4. I fail to see what Fisk has done wrong. He clearly states the possibility that the letter is a fake. Should he not mention it because no-one (including yourselves no doubt) knows if it’s real or not? He does claim that the results are highly dubious, and I have no evidence to the contrary. I don’t think the problem lies there anyway. It is not whether the elections were ‘democratic’ or not that bothers me so much as why it is such a big scandal in our press as opposed to the openly illegal oppression of the Palestinians and the openly colonialist utterances of Israel’s leaders. Also, given the first election of G W Bush, I hardly think the US has any advice to give the Iranians.

  5. Explain to me how this passage proves what you are saying about Fisk. I read nothing but doubt about this letter:

    “Could this letter be a fake? Even if Mr Mousavi won so many votes, could the colourless Mr Karroubi have followed only six million votes behind him? And however incredible Mr Ahmadinejad’s officially declared 63 per cent of the vote may have been, could he really – as a man who has immense support among the poor of Iran – have picked up only five-and-a-half million votes? And would a letter of such immense importance be signed only “on behalf of the minister”?

    The letter may well join the thousands of documents, real and forged, that have shaped Iran’s recent history, the most memorable of which were the Irish passports upon which Messers Robert McFarlane and Oliver North travelled to Iran on behalf of the US government in 1986 to offer missiles for hostages. The passports were real – and stolen – but the identities written onto the document were fake.”

    I am not reading that FIsk “is claiming, based on the photocopy of a forged letter being distributed at an opposition rally, that not only did Ahmadinejad lose, he lost by a margin of 4-to-1” as you state. I am reading that he is saying this letter, no matter what it represents, has electrified different factions. He is saying there are doubtless election irregularities, but this letter doesn’t make sense either.

    Am I just stupid?

  6. Fisk writes:

    In a highly sophisticated society like Iran, forgery is as efficient as anywhere in the West and there are reasons for both distrusting and believing this document. But it divides the final vote between Mr Mousavi and Mr Karroubi in such a way that it would have forced a second run-off vote – scarcely something Mousavi’s camp would have wanted.

    His first sentence says there are reasons for ‘both distrusting and believing this document’. His second sentence implies it couldn’t have been a forgery since it doesn’t suggest the ideal outcome for Mussavi. In other words, the document ist more likely not to be a forgery.

    Nothing really complicated there. Which part of that you had trouble deciphering?

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